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Carola Frege* 
Co-operative Workplace Relations in East Germany?  
A Study of Works Councils in the Textile Industry**  
 
This study has two aims: firstly to examine the general pattern of works 
councillor attitudes towards management in the East German textile industry; 
secondly to investigate the effectiveness of these works councils in representing 
workers' interests. A survey of works councillors in over fifty mostly privatised textile 
firms provided some initial indication that they have a cautious, co-operative attitude 
towards management and are surely not „extended arms of management“      as has 
been often declared in the literature. Moreover, a survey of the unionised workers in 
these firms revealed an overwhelming acceptance of their works councils and a 
conviction that the limited effectiveness of these institutions is mainly caused by the 
current economic constraints rather than by internal deficiencies of the new 
institutions. 
 
Dieser Artikel verfolgt zwei Zielsetzungen: Es werden die Einstellungen von 
Betriebsräten zur Betriebsleitung und die Wirksamkeit ihrer Interessenvertretung in 
über 50 ostdeutschen Textilunternehmen untersucht. Die Fragebogenuntersuchung 
der Betriebsräte zeigt eine vorsichtige, grundsätzlich kooperative Einstellung zur 
Betriebsleitung und widerspricht dem in der Literatur häufig dargestellten Bild des 
ostdeutschen Betriebsrat als „wehrloses Anhängsel“ der Betriebsleitung. Die 
Befragung der gewerkschaftlich organisierten ArbeiterInnen in diesen Unternehmen 
unterstützt dieses Ergebnis und zeigt, daß der Betriebsrat mehrheitlich begrüßt und 
als neue institutionalisierte Interessenvertretung akzeptiert und auch aktiv unterstützt 
wird. Die eingeschränkten Erfolge der Betriebsräte in den letzten Jahren werden in 
erster Linie der schwierigen wirtschaftlichen Lage der Textilindustrie und nicht, wie 
vielfach vermutet, Unzulänglichkeiten der Institutionen selber zugeschrieben. 
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1. Introduction 
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Works councils were forbidden during the socialist regime but have been widely 
established following the transfer of the (West) German industrial relations system into 
the East in 1990 (see Jander and Lutz 1991; Kirschner 1991).1 The development of 
works councils in East Germany after Unification has been a popular topic of industrial 
relations research in the last five years (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993; David 1992; 
Mickler and Walker 1992; Röske and Wassermann 1991; SOFI Göttingen [e.g. Bluhm, 
Kern and Land, Kirschner, Voßkamp and Wittke]; Berlin/Göttingen group [Kädtler, 
Kottwitz, Jander, Lutz, Rosenbaum, Weinert]; WISOC Chemnitz [e.g. Ermischer, 
Kreißig, Lungwitz, Preusche]). Although much interesting work has been done, there 
are perhaps two deficiencies. The first is at the methodological level. The published 
research is almost entirely based on expert interviews and/or case studies of specific 
companies. More representative, quantitative studies have yet to be undertaken. The 
second deficiency is on a contextual level. Although it has been frequently argued that 
employees are crucial actors at workplace level, there are still no broadly-based, 
quantitative studies of their attitudes, opinions or behaviour at this level.  
This paper addresses these deficiencies in a study of workplace relations in the 
East German textile industry. Two main issues are discussed. Firstly, it examines the 
pattern of works councillor attitudes towards management through a questionnaire. 
Secondly and perhaps more importantly, it investigates the extent to which works 
councils are effective in representing workers interests. This will be discussed by 
analysing the perceptions of unionized workers towards their own works councils. 
The paper starts by reviewing the relevant literature on workplace relations in East 
Germany.  
2.  Co-operative Workplace Relations or Works Councils as „Extended Arms 
of Management“?  
Research on East German workplace relations commonly distinguishes between 
the period before and the period after privatisation of the East German enterprises,2 
since privatisation is seen as having a radical impact on workplace relations (e.g. 
Dathe and Schreiber 1993: 6; Ermischer and Preusche 1992; Hürtgen 1992). With 
regard to the first period, one may distinguish two views. The first argues that the 
relationship between management and works council was typically essentially co-
operative, whilst the second argues that it was one in which the works council was 
typically subservient.  
                                                          
1  The West German Works Constitution Act (BetrVG 1972), the legal foundation of works 
councils, was introduced on June 1st 1990 before the political Unification (October 1990).  
2  The East German (state) industry was privatised through the Treuhandanstalt Berlin, the state 
privatisation agency, which started its work in 1991. The Treuhand took over the assets and 
liabilities (over 100 Mrd Deutsche Mark) of the East German industry (combines). In 1992 
the Treuhand had responsibility for over 5.100 companies (Treuhand prospectus 
„Entschlossen Sanieren“ 1992: 17). In the end of 1994/beginning of 1995 the Treuhand had 
completed its work of privatising most of the firms and was dissolved. 
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Analysts in the first tradition see the enterprise as being characterized by a co-
operative relationship, i.e. „co-management“ (Ermischer and Preusche 1993) or 
„partnership for progress/construction“ („Aufbaupartnerschaft“) (Röske and Wasser-
mann 1991), and they offer three main reasons.  
Firstly, the legacy of former socialisation and „collective“ experiences in 
socialist workplaces (e.g. life-long employment in the same firm, everyone knowing 
each other, and with no extreme social status differences between management and 
workers) is said to enhance co-operation.  
Secondly, there is said to have been a particular inter-dependence between 
management and works councils: both parties had an equal status in the beginning, 
even that management was sometimes in a weaker situation since it had to earn/ 
regain legitimacy from the workforce (i.e. unclarified power relations, i.e. „power 
vacuum“ [Machtvakuum]) (e.g. Kirschner 1992: 85). Consequently, it is claimed that 
management was dependent on the works council to get the support of the workforce 
for any restructuring. Moreover, both parties faced radical challenges from the 
internal and external environments. It is argued that this worked as a force for co-
operative relations in order to have at least one stabilizing factor during the difficult 
survival process. According to Ermischer and Preusche (1995: 55) „the co-operation 
enhanced the plant level process of transformation and helped to compensate for the 
lack of experience of both management and the works council with the strange 
economic and legal system“. One should also note that the common „enemy“, the 
Treuhand (the state privatisation agency) arguably induced „emergency associations“ 
(Notgemeinschaften).  
Thirdly, there was the particularly unifying aim of (a) preparing the enterprise for 
the market economy (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993: 9), and (b) of dismantling the 
political structures, i.e. „de-ideologisation“ of the work structure and organisation (e.g. 
getting rid of the „red socks“). Some even argue that there has been a third unifying 
aim, the development of more employee involvement (Ermischer and Preusche 1992: 2).  
In sum, these authors conclude that co-management generally emerged in their 
case study companies because of the specific internal situations after the „Wende“ 
(turnaround). Ermischer and Preusche's empirical investigation (interviews in 34 
companies of mostly the metal industry in Saxony from 1991 onwards) bases its 
conclusion on the finding that in the majority of cases the management and works 
council saw their relationship as a positive, co-operative relationship with the aim of 
achieving consensus (1993: 185).  
It is a weakness of these studies that we are not told which interview questions 
were asked, nor are important terms like „co-operation“ clearly defined. For example, 
the perception of „shared goals“ does not necessarily lead to an effective 
codetermination, i.e. co-operation. It is also possible that if a works council shares the 
same goals as management, it does not see the need to become pro-active.  
This view is supported by the other school of thought on these issues who propose 
that co-operative works councils in East Germany are „extended arms of management“ 
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rather than „independent“ and effective worker institutions. Some of their arguments 
will be reviewed: Jander and Lutz (1991: 411) of the Berlin/Göttingen group found in 
their surveys3 that cases of pro-active works councils were the exception rather than the 
rule, and they speculate that these were likely to have been concentrated around Leipzig 
and Dresden (the home of the civil movement). They also found that even in the 
beginning, when works councils formally attended management meetings, they did not 
participate greatly in the decision making, but basically agreed to decisions which 
sounded economically rational. For example, there was no works council in their sample 
which had developed alternatives to management's reconstruction concept. In general, 
works councillors were found to be very open to economic arguments because of their 
belief that economic irrationality led the former system into ruin. Economic rationality 
and especially technological progress were often seen as panaceas (also Dathe and 
Schreiber 1993: 42; David 1992: 132-134). Mickler et al.'s case study of VW gives an 
impressive account of the works council's agreement to the introduction of lean 
production without any restrictions (1992: 16). Moreover, according to Jander and Lutz 
(ibid.) East German works councils generally did not (and still do not) mobilize against 
staff reductions, because they are accepted as unavoidable, and avoid any politicisation 
of labour relations, since this is seen as a core reason for the old mis-management. 
Consequently, as Kädtler and Kottwitz (1994: 27) argue, the „works council as a 
partner/arm of management“ is often believed by works councillors themselves to be the 
ideal type (see Kotthoff's typology below). Accordingly, as the authors conclude, the 
relationship between management and works council is not seen by the councillors as 
the expression of any fundamental conflict of interest but as a „functional 
complementary relationship“. Similarly, their study found that works councils, having 
realized that their scope for action is very limited, were persuaded that co-operation is 
the best posture. The authors mention that „it is not the announcement of a third or 
fourth redundancy round which causes a 'hardening of the fronts' but instead the times 
when management violates the rights of the works council or is guilty of negligence“ 
(p.28). Thus, only when informal norms were violated, did the works council become 
„aggressive“.4  
Jander and Lutz also remark that the early attendance of the works council at 
board meetings in some firms could easily be seen more as a management strategy to 
get the workers to accept organisational changes than as an indicator of co-
management. In addition, Kädtler (1992: 8-10) cannot find any evidence to suggest that 
                                                          
3  Expert interviews and documentary work in 40 companies in Saxony and Thüringen during the 
unification period (1989/90) and six intensive longitudinal case studies (mainly from interviews 
with works councils) in these regions, plus equivalent investigations around Berlin (22 
companies) till 1992/3 (see Jander and Lutz 1991; Kädtler and Kottwitz 1994) make up their 
empirical underpinning. Most companies were of the metal, chemical or electronics industry.  
4  The author of the present article observed the same in a chemical company which she visited 
in Bitterfeld in 1993. It experienced mass redundancies without any interference from the 
works council or workforce, but when management once violated a specific legal 
(information) right of the works council, the works council organized an immediate walkout.  
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there were conflicts in the early period (Winter 1989) in those enterprises, which had 
quite extensive rights for their works councils, over the introduction of the more 
restrictive German works councils law. He goes so far as to argue that even if the 
broader participation rights had been kept, the outcome of „co-management“ would 
have been the same, largely due to the particular economic and political context.  
There is more agreement among analysts as the quality of workplace relations 
after privatisation. The workforce, works council and management no longer jointly 
face the Treuhand in safeguarding the interests of the enterprise. It is argued that the 
classic division of interests between capital and labour therefore becomes more 
explicit (Ermischer and Preusche 1995: 59; Lungwitz and Preusche 1994). Workplace 
relations become characterized on the one side by management strengthening its 
position (e.g. legitimized by new owners or by a management buy-out), and 
frequently reinforcing „taylorist“ control and disciplinary methods (e.g. Bluhm 1992; 
Lippold et al. 1992; Voskamp and Wittke 1991). On the other side the deteriorating 
economic situation is regarded as to reduce the task of works councils to that of 
administrating redundancies instead of „co-managing“ the on-going reorganisation. 
For example, Mickler et al.'s case study (e.g. 1992) of the new Volkswagen car 
factory in Saxony showed that the informal „survival pacts“ which existed in 1990 
were starting to fall apart by 1992: management wanted more productivity and the 
workforce wanted to keep their traditional piece rates and customs. Thus, Mickler et 
al. write that it is „not the democratisation of workplace relations, but company’s 
survival, massive redundancies and the securing of a minimum social standard 
[which] determines the daily work of the councils“ (1993: 21). Finally, it is argued 
that privatisation often leads to the employment of West German or foreign managers 
who are likely to challenge the established East German community (see Aderhold et 
al. 1994). 
In sum, the literature on workplace relations in East German enterprises before 
privatisation can be categorized into two broad camps, a positive/optimistic one (e.g. 
WISOC) who propose co-operative (and effective) works councils, and a negative/ 
pessimistic one (e.g. Berlin/Göttingen). Obviously, these two groups are „ideal 
types“. Both sides however agree that there has been a shift and deterioration in 
works council-management relations over the years.  
The characterisation by some researchers of early workplace relations as co-
operative would be enhanced by a precise definition of concepts such as „co-
operation“ or „co-management“. Was it „real“ co-operation, say between two equally 
strong partners,5 or a more one-sided acquiescence on the part of the works council? 
Furthermore, the argument that „co-operation“ has declined since privatisation does 
not say what it has been substituted by. Does „non-co-operation“ mean a conflictual 
relationship or does it mean that the works council becomes (or continues to be) an 
extended arm of management, thus administering management functions, as 
                                                          
5  Co-operation is often defined differently, e.g. that people willingly co-operate because of 
mutual gains (see Axelrod 1990).  
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Mahnkopf (1991: 280) or Jander and Lutz (1991) argue? Obviously, it is difficult at 
this stage to make clear judgements about this development, so that statements 
inevitably remain vague, e.g. Ermischer and Preusche's (1995: 60) conclusion that 
their case studies in 1994 show „more conflictual relations without the loss of co-
operation“. In addition, the discussion on „co-management or conflict“ seems to be 
burdened with the problem that the authors seem to have different understandings of 
what they mean by these terms, and that the concepts themselves are difficult to 
operationalize.  
3.  Effective Works Councils? 
Related to the question of co-operation is whether works councils manage to 
represent workers' interests effectively or not. However, there is little West German 
research evaluating the quality of workplace relations and, in particular, examining 
the interrelation between the two actors in terms of effective interest representation. 
The only major study which focuses on the quality of interest representation is 
Kotthoff's longitudinal case study analysis of 64 companies (1981; 1994),6 which 
created a useful typology of works councils and distinguished between: (i) deficient 
forms of interest representation: „the ignored works council“; „the isolated works 
council“; „the works council as an extended arm of management“; and (ii) effective 
forms of (autonomous) interest representation: „the respected, co-operative works 
council“; „the respected, steadfast works council“; and „the works council as a co-
operative hostile power“. There is no corresponding East German research on this 
issue, which is partly explained by the fact that it is especially hard to measure the 
effectiveness of interest representation during times of transformation. The most 
common approach in the current East German literature is to outline some problems 
which works councils are currently facing and to assert (rather than to analyse) that 
these problems hinder the proper functioning of works councils. There are at least 
five problems mentioned in the literature (more by the Berlin/Göttingen group, e.g. 
Kädtler and Kottwitz (1993; 1994), than by WISOC) and it is difficult to disentangle 
them: (i) the intensified classical dilemma facing works councils of balancing the 
interests of the company and the workforce in the devastating economic situation of 
East Germany (e.g. Kottwitz 1991: 417); (ii) the unsuitability of the West German 
industrial relations system in the East German context (one frequently given reason for 
which is the absence of prosperous companies which are said to be a precondition for 
the successful functioning of the German industrial relations system) (e.g. Gut et al. 
1993; Kädtler and Kottwitz 1994: 19, 1992: 3; Mahnkopf 1992); (iii) problems due to 
the newness of the institution, for example the fact that works councils lack tacit skills 
which are seen as necessary for the effective articulation and representation of interests 
(e.g. Jander and Lutz 1993; Mahnkopf 1991: 275); (iv) the problematic union-works 
council relationship (rising „plant-egoism“ of works councils vs. collective interests of 
                                                          
6  In various industries in Baden-Würtemberg in 1974/5, and 15 years later he looked at the 
same case studies again to measure possible changes in workplace relations. 
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the unions) (e.g. Lippold et al. 1992; Mahnkopf 1991: 282, 1993: 17); and (v) the 
supposedly low image of the works council among the workforce, i.e. workers perceive 
works councils as ineffective (e.g. Jander et al. 1992).  
Kädtler and Kottwitz (1993: 4) go so far as to suggest that these deficiencies in 
workplace relations have implications for the functioning of the whole industrial 
relations system. According to Jander and Lutz (1993) there is the paradox that 
although the West German industrial relations system was transferred without any 
adjustments to the particular East German situation, East Germany could very well 
end up not practising the same industrial relations as the West, especially because of 
the ineffective works councils (see also Jacoby 1994). For these researchers therefore 
the likely scenario is of a few companies with „good“ workplace relations surrounded 
by a majority of companies with poor co-determination practices (see also Mahnkopf 
1991).  
However, listing possible reasons why works councils might not be effective is 
not an entirely satisfactory exercise. The authors do not provide persuasive evidence as 
to why these problems render works councils ineffective, nor do they analyse whether 
these supposed problems are short-term (due to the novelty of the institutions) or long-
term (due to the structural unsuitability of western regulations in the East). 
Furthermore, it has also not been tested how far these problems, rather than, for 
example, unco-operative management, account for any works council ineffectiveness. 
There are also problems with the arguments as such. To give just one example: arguing 
that the West German system is not suitable for the specific East German situation does 
not provide a convincing explanation why this should evoke a dysfunctioning of the 
works council. Without wanting to go into the debate as to how far the situation in the 
East today is comparable with that of West Germany after 1945 (see Jacoby 1994), it 
seems a dubious assertion that the West German industrial relations system only 
„works“ in prosperous economic situations. The system seems to have managed 
various recessions during the last few decades in West Germany.  
As said before most of the studies are based solely on interviews with 
councillors (and sometimes with management). Very few came from more 
comprehensive case studies and none includes workers' attitudes and behaviour 
towards the new institutions. This study attempts to contribute to the analysis of the 
quality of workplace relations in East German firms in two ways. Co-operative 
workplace relations will be investigated by focusing on one side, works councillors' 
attitudes towards management, only. Moreover, the study examines the „customers“ 
of works councils, the workforce, and analyse their perceptions of the works council's 
effectiveness.  
4.  Method 
The study comprised two surveys, one of works councillors and one of 
unionized workers in selected textile companies in East Germany. The purpose was to 
apply a quantitative method to the investigation of the workplace relations from a 
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works councillors' and workers' point of view in a larger sample of workplaces 
(compared to the research reviewed).7  
The textile industry was and still is (similar to other manufacturing industries) 
severely affected by Unification and the subsequent exposure to the world market 
which led to a dramatic reduction in employment8 (e.g. Küchle and Volkmann 1993). 
It was mainly selected because the textile industry is a sector which has not been 
looked at in the research of transformation and is largely neglected in the general 
industrial relations studies in Germany.  
The two surveys9 were carried out in 1994 in textile firms across the bargaining 
region of the South East branch of the German textile union, GTB (Gewerkschaft für 
Textil und Bekleidung). The union branch covers the largest part of East Germany 
and includes the traditional textile cities in Saxony. At the time of the study (Summer 
1994) this union area comprised 385 textile and clothing firms with 28,070 
employees, of which 14,425 were union members. This results in a union density of 
48.2% (GTB Information 1994).  
The works councillor questionnaire was distributed to works councils of that 
district and was returned by 53 works councils.10 The questionnaire consisted of two 
parts, one dealing with background information of the extent of transformation which 
occurred in the firm, the other dealing with a set of Likert-scale attitudinal questions 
on the workplace climate. These were adopted from Dastmalchian et al. (1991), 
Angle and Perry (1986) and Allen and Stephenson (1983).  
The union membership questionnaire was conducted in the above surveyed 53 
textile firms in 1994 and comprised altogether 73 questions on various issues of the 
transformation of the workplaces. The questionnaire was distributed through the union 
machinery and works councils to union members. 440 completed questionnaires were 
returned, which gives a response rate of approximately 40%. All questions were 
answered on 5-point Likert scales. A selection of the items which deal with workers' 
perception of the works council and workers' willingness to actively support the works 
council is presented in the table of the results section. Workers' willingness to become 
active is used as an additional, more indirect measure of people's views of the 
instrumentality of works councils. A certain amount of trust in the institutions' 
effectiveness is assumed to be necessary for people to engage in works councils' 
                                                          
7  It would have been too difficult to approach management in these companies, as access was 
secured through the union.    
8  Between 1990 and 1993 the textile industry experienced a fall in output of 72%  (Statistisches 
Bundesamt). Of the 320.000 textile employees in 1989 only 27.000 remained in 1994 (a fall 
of 90%) (GTB Information). 
9  Copies are available from the author. 
10  The return rate is not known, since it was beyond the author's control to monitor the number 
of firms which received the questionnaire. In the most unlikely case that all unionized works 
councils in the district (148) had received a questionnaire, the rate would be 35,8%. The 
questionnaire was to be filled out by one full-time councillor, not necessarily the chief 
councillor. The questionnaire consists of 29 questions altogether.  
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activities. The items were taken from Deshpande and Fiorito (1989), Fiorito (1988), 
and Hartley et al. (1991) and were adapted to the specific context of works councils. 
Virtually no respondent filled out the company's name, which prevented a correlation 
of workers' and works councillors' questionnaires of the same company. 
5.  Results  
5.1  Background Company Information of the Works Councillor Survey 
Four topics were discussed, organisational changes (ownership, management, 
staff reductions, technology), workforce characteristics (male/female ratio), union 
membership (density), and incidents of industrial conflict. Most firms had been 
privatised (only 7 were still owned by the Treuhand) and belonged to West German 
or foreign companies or via MBO to management. Changes in management had 
occurred in most sites, yet there was a mixed picture regarding old/new managers. 22 
(out of 53) firms had either kept all or most former managers and 30 firms kept no or 
only very few former managers. At the supervisory level nothing really had changed, 
with 41 firms having kept the former supervisors. T-tests11 revealed no significant 
differences between private and state ownership with regard to changes at 
supervisory level and changes in management. Thus, privately owned firms had not 
necessarily more „new“ supervisors and managers than Treuhand firms.  
With regard to staff reductions, most firms had reduced their staff by at least 
50%,12 which was not uncommon in other industries (e.g. Nolte and Sitte 1995). With 
regard to the medium-term prospects of their firms, the respondents were split: 22 were 
sceptical and 20 were more optimistic. Privately owned firms were more optimistic 
than Treuhand firms, and firms with new management felt more secure than those with 
former managers staying.13 A majority of firms had invested in new machinery and 
restructured the production process. Most works councillors perceived the work pace 
on the shopfloor to have increased enormously from 1989. With regard to the 
workforce, in only three firms was the female rate less than 50% of the total workforce, 
and in 16 it was higher than 90%. This confirms the female dominance in the textile 
workforce. Union density was still high: in 11 firms it was over 80% and in 20 between 
30 and 79% (which is roughly in line with the union density of the district: 48,2%). T-
tests revealed that the density was stronger in firms with former managers and in more 
unsecure firms, but not necessarily stronger in Treuhand firms compared to private 
ones. There were only three incidences of industrial unrest so far, which supports the 
idea of the textile industry as a non-militant sector, and the larger the female share in 
the workforce the lower was the likelihood of industrial unrest. Finally, with regard to 
the responding works councillors, over half have had been in position since 1990/91. 
                                                          
11  T-tests are available from the author. 
12  In 1989 half of the firms employed between 200 and 1000 employees, in 1994 most of them 
employed  less than 100 employees.  
13  This was confirmed by t-tests.  
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16 had been active members of the former socialist union branch (BGL = 
„Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung“), and 34 had not. Thus, Martens' (1992) suggestion that 
old unionists are in a majority in East German works councils could not be supported 
here. Furthermore, although this was not explicitly controlled for, one can assume that 
all respondents were union members (since the GTB only distributed questionnaires to 
unionised works councils14).  
5.2  Workplace Climate from the Viewpoint of the Works Councillors 
The idea was to apply a set of previously tested questions here in order to 
examine the quality of workplace relations (i.e. workplace climate) from the works 
councillors' viewpoint. It is obvious that this cannot provide a complete picture of the 
workplace situation. In addition, this small-scale survey is not able to establish 
various types of works councils such as Kotthoff's detailed categorisation. However, 
it might be a first approach to investigate the two opposite hypotheses of the 
literature, works council as „co-manager“ or as a powerless „extended arm of 
management“ in a relatively large sample of one industrial sector. The first eight 
items of table 1 define the quality of the management–works council relations, 
whereas the remaining questions explore broader related topics.  
Three quarters of the respondents agreed on most issues, and there were virtually 
no missing answers. The first eight items were put into factor analysis and revealed 
two factors. The first factor (items 1.-4.) is concerned with the practice of 
management–works council relations, whereas the second factor (items 6.-8.) 
describes councillors' more general views on management.15  
 
Table 1:  Absolute level of items of works council-management relations (N= sample size) 
                                                          
14  Which means that at least the chief councillor is a union member. 
15  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure = 0,6685; cumulated pct of variance = 65,6; factor 1 (items 
1.,2.,3.,4.): eigenvalue = 1,36214 (pct of variance = 17,0); alpha = 0,677 (standardized alpha 
= 0,679); factor 2 (items 6.,7.,8.): eigenvalue = 2,70014 (pct of variance = 33,8); alpha = 
0,598 (standardized alpha = 0,598). 
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With regard to the first factor, the workplace relationship was typically 
perceived as harmonious, the councillors were willing to do their part, and problems 
were often solved informally. On the other hand, councillors felt insufficiently 
involved in strategic planning and insufficiently informed. These might be seen as 
„standard“ complaints of councillors and one might conclude that in overall the 
positive perception of the general relationship succeeds.  
There were significant correlations16 between whether the general relationship 
was perceived as positive and the number of former directors employed in this 
company (r= .29*) and whether the councillor was a former BGL official (r= .27*): 
Works councillors in a company with no former directors were more likely to 
perceive the relationship as „good“ as in companies with former directors, and works 
councillors who were not former BGL officials were more likely to perceive the 
relationship as good than works councillors who were former BGL officials. This was 
also confirmed by t-tests. Thus, contrary to some suggestions in the literature (e.g. 
Ermischer and Preusche 1992) it may be that the old networks between directors and 
                                                          
16  Significance level: * = p<= 0,05, ** = p<= 0,01    
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union officials are more obstructive than helpful in creating co-operative workplace 
relations in the privatised firms.  
Furthermore, the general perception of the workplace relations is correlated with 
the following questions: the more works councils were involved in strategic planning 
(r= .35*) or feel sufficiently informed (r= -.38**), the more they perceived a positive 
relationship with management and the less likely they described management as 
strengthening its power. Moreover, companies which had not experienced industrial 
conflicts were more likely to have this harmonious relationship (r= .35*). 
Furthermore, t-tests found that the more insecure the future of the firm, the more the 
works council saw the need for harmonious relationships (in the best interest of the 
workforce). This is a very interesting finding. At first sight one might interpret good 
relationships with management as coming out of a weak bargaining position of the 
works council. However, it seems more likely that it means that difficult times bind 
the two sides together.  
Finally, t-tests revealed that companies with former managers were more likely 
to have informal negotiations. This might indicate a legacy of former socialist 
workplace relations in firms with predominantly former managerial staff, as has been 
suggested in previous studies (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche 1993). Obviously it is 
difficult to evaluate at this stage whether this is a temporary or a permanent 
phenomenon.  
With regard to the second factor („general views of management“) the overall 
result is less positive. Management was perceived untrustful and as trying to 
strengthen its power (t-tests revealed that this is more perceived in financially 
„secure“ than in „insecure“ firms). In addition, the councillors acknowledged the 
conflicting interests of employers and unions. If management was perceived to be 
seeking to strengthen its power, works councils were also more likely to perceive 
union–employer relations as antagonistic (r= .31*). However, t-tests did not reveal a 
significant difference between private and state ownership with regard to perceptions 
of different interests.  
In sum, it seems that although the works councillors were convinced of the 
desirability of harmonious relations, and were willing to do its part, they realised that 
management was sometimes less willing to co-operate, and they perceived a 
difference of interests of both sides. 
Regarding the second part of the questionnaire, works councils were described 
primarily as connecting links between management and workforce, thus not as a pure 
interest representation, and consequently the well-being of the company was seen as 
of prime importance. This is also a typical phenomenon in West German studies (e.g. 
Kotthoff 1994) and in line with the legislative objectives (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). 
The data also adds support to the argument in the literature that „plant-level 
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egoism“17 predominates East German works councils (e.g. Lippold et al. 1992; 
Mahnkopf 1991: 282; 1993: 17).  
Furthermore, management was seen as pursuing a trustworthy relationship with 
the workforce, which correlated with the general perception of good workplace 
relations (r= .68**) and with works councils being described as a connecting link 
between management and workforce (r= .32*). Interestingly, the higher the share of 
females in the workforce, the more management was perceived as fostering a trustful 
relation with the workforce (r= .50**), and the works councils as a connecting link 
(r= .31*). However there was no significant difference between private and state 
owned firms with regard to management's relationship to the workforce.  
Finally, the workforce was perceived as supporting the works council, especially 
in firms employing few former directors. Thus, the councillors argued that workplace 
relations are generally better in firms with new management than with the old 
directors. Yet, the workforce is said to support the works council more in firms with 
new management. One could follow that the works council saw privatisation and new 
management as favourable conditions, whereas the workforce might have more them-
and-us feelings towards the new management (and therefore supports their interest 
representation stronger).  
5.3  Union Members' Perceptions of Works Councils 
The sample of the unionised workforce18 contained 70% females, 25% present 
or past works council members, 8% union officials, 17% who declared themselves as 
formerly active union members, and 75% blue collar workers. The sample slightly 
underrepresents women textile workers and overrepresents works council members 
and union officials. The author has no information on the representativeness of the 
age distribution for textile companies in this area.19 Table 2 presents the items of 
workers' perceptions of the instrumentality (effectiveness) of works councils and of 
workers' willingness to actively support works councils. 
The overall importance of works councils was widely acknowledged. The 
comparison between the BGL (former socialist union branch at shopfloor level) and 
the works council received more divided answers, but still more than a half preferred 
the works council. With regard to members' perception of works council effectiveness 
in dealing with specific workplace issues, the results were nearly equally split in 
positive and negative perceptions, but with slightly more emphasis on the negative 
side. However, one should note that people were not being asked here their overall 
views on being represented by their works council. There were no significant 
                                                          
17  Priority are company concerns rather than industry-wide concerns which chraracterize union 
policies. 
18  Since access was secured through the union and works councils the sample was restricted to 
union members only.  
19  12% are under 30 years, 37% are between 30-40 years, 25% between 41-50 years and 20% 
are more than 50 years old. 
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differences regarding gender or age. Blue collar workers were slightly more negative 
about works councils' effectiveness than white collars.20  
Table 2:  Level of items of instrumentality of works council and level of items of willingness to 
participate in works council activities (N= sample size) 
 
 
Furthermore, union members blamed the economic situation rather than 
management's strategies for works council's limited effectiveness. There was also a 
strong agreement on the need for active support of the works council. Moreover, the 
data revealed a strong declared willingness to participate in time-limited, „organised“ 
activities (i.e. activities organised by the works council) such as attending the works 
council assemblies, but less willingness to become active in more time consuming, 
„self-initiated“ activities (i.e. activities where people deliberately take the initiative to 
become active). T-tests revealed no significant demographic differences.  
                                                          
20  T-tests are available from the author. 
210   Frege: Co-operative Workplace Relations in East Germany? 
 
6.  Discussion 
The findings of the works councillor questionnaire contribute to two 
propositions of the literature reviewed. Firstly, they cannot support the widespread 
claim of researchers that workplace relations were more antagonistic or that the 
works council was pushed to the sidelines after privatisation. Clearly, this data is a 
„snap shot“, not longitudinal and thus does not provide information on possible 
changes before and after privatisation. Furthermore, the small sample and the limited 
number of questions do not allow a final judgement on the quality of works council-
management relations. However, the data gives a first indication that the current 
relationship in these firms, which are mostly privatised, was generally harmonious. 
Thus, the data adds support to the argument of „co-management“ by the WISOC 
group (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche 1992). Moreover, it challenges the argument that 
co-management is at risk in firms after privatisation (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche 
1995: 59), and that privatisation is likely to cause a polarisation between the two 
sides (e.g. Kern and Land 1991). In contrast, the data revealed that co-operation was 
more likely where there were „new“ managers and „new“ works councillors. A rather 
straightforward interpretation for this perhaps surprising finding is that the old 
relations between directors and worker representatives were highly distrustful and 
conflictual and privatisation enabled „fresh blood“ to make a new start. This assumes 
that both sides perceive co-operative relations as worthwhile (the councillors 
acknowledged this).  
Secondly, the findings oppose the fears of some researchers (especially the 
Berlin/Göttingen group) that works councils are powerless „extended arms of 
management“. Although the councillors in this sample are obviously not „conflictual, 
class conscious works councils“ and strongly antagonistic (see Kotthoff's typology 
above), they are very aware of the different interests of capital and labour and also of 
the power balance within the firm and do not necessarily trust management. Thus, 
they surely do not represent Kotthoff's „deficient“ types of works councils (isolated, 
ignored, extended arm of management), but more his „effective“ types, in particular 
the „respected, co- operative“ works council. In other words, the data supports more 
the hypothesis of co-operative relationships than that of a one-sided acquiescence on 
the part of the works councils. However, the survey certainly does not allow any final 
conclusion regarding the practical effectiveness of the works councils' interest 
representation, and therefore the categorisation can be only speculative. The real 
effectiveness of these councils is better to be explored by methods such as non-
participative observation or interviews with the workforce or by the workforce 
questionnaires. However, the finding that the works councils felt strongly supported 
by the workforce might be a first indicator of the works councils' functioning and 
indeed its effectiveness.  
With regard to the membership questionnaire the three major findings are firstly 
the overall acceptance of the works council as a necessary institution, and a clear 
preference for the new interest institution. This also confirms the preliminary 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 4. Jg., Heft 3, 1997  211 
 
suggestion in the works council questionnaire, that works councils saw themselves 
being accepted by their workforce.  
The second major result refers to the divided views on the works council's actual 
work. One needs to address how this finding relates to the hypothesis in the literature 
that workers are highly disillusioned over the effectiveness of works councils (with 
respect to the redundancies, co-management etc.). Workers were realistic about the 
limited resources of works councils in these economic circumstances. This might be 
disappointing, yet it did not lead people to reject the institution as such. In short, 
although the findings do not suggest highly effective and powerful institutions, 
workers conclude that this is related more to the external conditions than to the design 
of the institution as such. One should add that this result might be biased by the fact 
that only union members were asked. However, this survey was also distributed to 
non-union members in the largest firm of our sample and the results for this firm did 
not reveal any significant differences between non-union members and members in 
this respect (see Frege 1996a, chp. 9). In sum, the data adds support to the more 
positive studies about workers' attitudes towards the works council, such as Heering 
and Schroeder (1992) who found that 76% of their sample had a positive attitude 
towards their works council (the precise question is however not published); and 
challenges pessimistic studies such as Jander et al. (1992). Moreover, the large-scale 
survey, DGB Trendbarometer (IFEP 1994) which surveys a representative sample of 
the German working population (employed and unemployed) every other year (since 
1992 in the East and West), on their attitudes towards interest institutions, shows that 
a majority of East German employees value the works councils' work in 1994 slightly 
more than in 1992, although they were still more critical than in the West: in 1994 
32% of East Germans valued the work (46% West Germans), 30% marked it 
negatively (25%). In particular, our data is more positive than the DGB results for the 
GTB (West and East): These were in 1992 considerably below the DGB German 
average with only 6% approving the works council's work (no separate data for 
1994). However 59% did not answer and the sample consisted of only 83 persons, 
which questions the data's reliability.21  
Finally, the third result refers to members' strong willingness to participate in 
certain works council activities and their conviction that workers' support is a 
necessary condition for works councils' effectiveness. This underlines workers' 
acceptance of the new institution and a conviction of its basic instrumentality. 
Besides, the data supports an established western theory that members are far easier 
to mobilize for selective collective actions than for continuous voluntary 
commitments. A similar distinction has also been found in the questions on union 
participation (see Frege 1996b) and also in West German studies. For example, 
Wiedenhofer (1979: 44) found 20% willing members to stand for works council 
election, the Sozialreport (1993: 30) found 23% willing to become active for „worker 
                                                          
21  Separate data of the West and East German members of the GTB is not available. 
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interests“, and Krieger et al. (1989: 165) found 36% of their union sample 
(representative for West Germany). 
7.  Conclusion 
Neither survey can provide the in-depth analysis of workplace relations that 
intensive case studies can provide. On the other hand it is rare to see relatively large 
samples of works councils and unionized workers being examined together, and this 
in an industrial sector which is normally neglected in such an area of research.  
In a nutshell the works councillor data presented co-operative attitudes towards 
management, in particular in firms with „new“ managers and „new“ councillors. 
However, the councillors were cautious in trusting management and critical about 
management's willingness to co-operate. They also did not perceive themselves as 
extended arms of management. Overall, it seems safe to say that co-operation might 
well be founded on the new transferred industrial relations institutions rather than 
being a legacy of the socialist times.  
Moreover, works councillors did not seem to neglect their representative tasks, 
as has been proposed in various studies (e.g. Jander and Lutz 1991; Kädtler and 
Kottwitz 1994). This is supported by the worker survey. The data reveals that, 
although successes were critically evaluated, workers were aware of the desperate 
economic situation limiting works council's possibilities. Thus the limited 
effectiveness of works councils did not prejudice people's acceptance, legitimisation 
and support of the new institutions (contrary to Jander et al. 1992). The works 
councils were widely accepted as a necessary and important interest institution at 
workplace level.  
In sum, both data sets support Kotthoff's category of an effective, respected and 
co-operative works council (which was also the major category in his West German 
study). This finding might stir up first doubts about the conclusion of some literature 
(e.g. Mense-Petermann 1996) that qualitatively different workplace relations 
becoming established in the East Germany (compared to the West). In addition, the 
data also indicates a successful „institutionalisation“ of the works council. Thus, not 
only were the works councils formally installed but also the „substantive“ or 
„normative“ establishment was successful in terms of the acceptance, legitimisation 
and support of the actors, i.e. workers, involved. This result stands in strong contrast 
to that of studies which emphasize the lack of workers' support for works councils 
and which postulate that the works councils have not yet been successfully 
institutionalised (e.g. Jander and Lutz 1993; Mahnkopf 1991: 280 pp; Lippold et al. 
1992: 92; Spangenberg 1993: 20). Finally, this data provides a first indication that the 
current problems of the East German works councils are far more likely to be caused 
by structural factors (i.e. recession, restructuring of the industry) than by internal 
factors (i.e. institutional deficiencies, lacking support of workforce) or indeed 
management strategies.  
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